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O  artigo  aborda  uma  seleção  parcial  de  muitos  direitos  reivindicados  pelos 
cidadãos  em  democracias  contemporâneas  a  respeito  do  sistema  jurídico, 
segurança  cidadã,  gênero,  jovens  e  acesso  à  informação  –  e  apresenta  o 
argumento de que “direitos” democráticos não são uma realidade homogênea 
como  apresentada  pela  teoria  liberal,  mas  um  conceito  complexo  e 
multifacetado. Nas novas democracias de “baixa qualidade”, a volatilidade de 
direitos  apresenta-se  como  um  desafio  especial  à  universalidade.  Um 
mapeamento  social  da  variação  e  distribuição  dos  direitos  negociáveis  são 
passíveis  de  desvelar  a  realidade  que  cai  na  retórica  do  universalismo.  Em 
sociedades altamente fragmentadas e desiguais, a retórica da universalidade é 
improvável de ser traduzida facilmente em aplicação da equidade verossímil. E a 
variabilidade  que  acompanha  pode  produzir  instabilidade  ou  volatilidade  por 
todo o tempo. Essa combinação em sociedades onde os “deveres”correspondem 
a  direitos  não  são  solidamente  internalizados  e  é  responsável  por  produzir 
modelos  de  comportamento  político  que  desviam substancialmente  da  inter-
subjetividade do interesse postulado pelo liberalismo clássico.  Ciclos  políticos 
“contenciosos” de resistência e exclusão, e lutas para reformular as regras do 
jogo (em lugar de simplesmente viver nelas) parecem ser correlações naturais 
desse  clima  de  incerteza.  Isso  é  particularmente  verdade  em  novas 
democracias,  onde súbitas explosões de clamores de direitos e multiplicidade 
destes  podem  facilmente  gerar  uma  atmosfera  de  inflação  de  direitos 
aumentando as expectativas além do que é provavelmente alcançável.
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Abstract
The article looks at a partial selection of the many rights claimed by citizens in 
contemporary democracies in the context of the justice system, citizen security, 
gender, youths, and access to information – and presents the argument that 
democratic “rights” are not a homogeneous reality as posited by liberal theory, 
but  a  complex,  multilayered  one.  In  new  “low  quality”  democracies,  rights 
volatility  presents  a  special  challenge  to  universality.  Social  mapping  of  the 
range and distribution of bankable rights is likely to uncover a reality that falls 
well  short  of  the rhetoric  of  universalism. In highly  fragmented and unequal 
societies, the rhetoric of universality is unlikely to translate easily into genuine 
evenness of application. And accompanying variability there may be instability or 
volatility  over  time.  This  combination  in  societies  where  the  “duties” 
corresponding  to  rights  are  not  securely  internalised,  is  liable  to  produce 
patterns of political  behaviour that deviate substantially from the interlocking 
mutuality  of  interest  postulated by classical  liberalism.  “Contentious” political 
cycles of resistance and exclusion, and struggles to reshape the rules of the 
game (rather than merely to live within them) seem to be natural correlates of 
this climate of uncertainty. This is particularly so in new democracies,  where 
sudden explosions of rights claims and multiplying rights claimants can easily 
generate an atmosphere of rights inflation can raise expectations well beyond 
what is reliably deliverable.
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Comparing Rights Enforcement and Democratic States
Every modern democratic state operates in a multiplicity of policy 
domains,  and interacts with the citizenry through a wide diversity of 
agencies  and  institutions.  This  means  that  the  ideal  of  “equality  of 
rights” has to be interpreted, filtered, and transmitted through a huge 
array of channels, most of which are primarily focussed on much more 
specialist tasks, and are in direct contact with only small subsections of 
the  total  electorate.  Thus,  the  police  must  uphold  the  ideal  of  an 
equality of right, while mainly concentrating on the control of crime and 
the maintenance of public order (not usually threatened by the median 
voter);  the  courts  must  dispense  justice  (for  which  purpose  on 
underpinning of democratic theory – or at least assumptions – is highly 
desirable if not essential). But the great bulk of the population never 
even enters a courthouse. The schools may provide civic education to 
the young, but their main objective is usually to train a workforce rather 
than build a republican consciousness. The same applies, for instance, to 
the tax administration and the consumer protection agency. Only the 
electoral  registration  agency  is  charged  with  directly  promoting  and 
protecting  the  democratic  rights  of  all  citizens,  and  is  expected  to 
achieve  universal  coverage  in  the  fulfilment  of  that  task.  Other 
instruments of democratic socialization operate in a restricted front and 
perhaps only at a local  level (such as safe drinking water and street 
lighting for all).
Similarly, from the perspective of the citizenry democratic rights 
are complex, diverse, fragmented, and perhaps even incommensurable. 
I have a right to the vote (provided I meet the specified age, nationality, 
residence and criminal and mental status criteria, which can vary widely 
from democracy to democracy – an automatic right in Costa Rica, one 
requiring registration and perhaps even a driver’s license in the U.S.A., 
to  give just  two examples).  In Britain,  I  have a right to  freedom of 
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information (but subject to the Official Secrets Act, plus whether other 
bureaucratic  or  market-derived  barriers  may  limit  the  practical 
application of that ideal). I also have a right to privacy (except that if a 
democradura  wishes  to  practice  surveillance,  perhaps  to  protect  our 
freedoms  from  terrorist  assault,  then  this  right  can  be  extensively 
curtailed).  Even my right to life  can be qualified  (if  the Metropolitan 
Police happen to mistake my trousers for a suicide belt, for instance). 
Certainly my right to education, to healthcare, even to habeas corpus, 
can be qualified and hedged.
Since  all  of  these  rights  are  to  some  extent  subject  to 
qualification or temporary suspension, I can only hope to enjoy the full 
panoply of my rights by monitoring them and by challenging attempts to 
infringe them. But in modern society no individual will get very far in 
challenging  authority  on  her  own  –  collective  action  and  community 
support  are  always  required  to  define,  defend,  and  promote  our 
democratic rights. “Take it on trust and you will be taken and trussed”. 
Moreover, there are evident tensions and indeed conflicts between the 
various potential contenders as “trumps” in the rights game (the right to 
information  versus  the  right  to  privacy;  the  right  to  protection  from 
crime versus the presumption of innocence, and so on). Some rights are 
legally enforceable entitlements; some are universally grounded moral 
convictions; some are passionately advocated and equally passionately 
resisted;  and  some  are  aspirations  rather  than  solidly  established 
expectations. Finally, in unequal societies, the objective and subjective 
distribution  of  rights  (whether  as  entitlements  or  as  aspirations)  is 
uneven between classes, races, regions, age cohorts, and genders.
According to a standard liberal view of rights every rights claim 
must  be  attached  to  individual  claimants,  and  each  claim  by  one 
individual generates a counterpart duty to meet that claim that falls on 
other  individuals.  But  such  precision  and  individuation  is  an  ideal 
construct quite far removed from the everyday life experience of most 
citizens,  even in  the best  established of  democracies.  Elsewhere and 
particularly in new democracies where such rights claims have not been 
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collectively internalized, individuals and groups have every incentive to 
overstate their claims and to sidestep the correlative duties.
The considerations in the above paragraphs apply to all  really 
existing modern democratic states, even to Sweden and Canada. How 
much more do these complications muddy the waters in the relatively 
“low  quality”  new democracies  that  are  more  typical  of  the  western 
hemisphere  today?  Elsewhere  I  have  argued  that  for  much  of  the 
population  in  most  Latin  America  and  Caribbean  democracies  their 
theoretical “rights” are perceived as patchy and unstable (WHITEHEAD, 
2004).  In  the  democracies  where  “quality”  is  most  subject  to 
questioning,  the  scope  and  coverage  of  rights  is  characteristically 
unstable and volatile. A certain minority may feel reasonably secure in 
all  of  their  rights.  A possibly  equal sized minority may be absolutely 
clear that such rights are not extended to themselves, but in between 
lies a wide array of citizens who cannot be sure. On good days they can 
claim some rights, especially if they agitate. If they stay passive, or if 
their  system is  subjected  to  some  shock,  rights  that  seemed  to  be 
assured can abruptly evaporate. Their pension fund can be seized and 
allocated to pay off foreign creditors. Their access to information can be 
abruptly  curtailed  by  censorship  or  manipulation.  The  leaders  who 
seemed accountable to them can with short notice turn into inaccessible 
autocrats or irresponsible incompetents. Experience teaches that as a 
rule rights are not stable and cannot be taken for granted; rather, they 
are  volatile.  But  this  in  no  way  undervalues  the  importance  of 
generating such rights. On the contrary, those citizens who feel most 
insecure  in  their  entitlement  to  rights  have  the  most  to  gain  from 
collective reiteration of such aspirations. Therefore it is assumed (both 
by citizens and by those in positions of state authority) that theoretical 
entitlements  will  only  be  made  “real”  from  time  to  time  and  under 
pressure from outside the state. The demand for an extension of rights 
may  be  particularly  explosive  in  societies  where  the  corresponding 
traditions of “dutifulness” are least well entrenched. This volatile climate 
of  expectations  helps  to  explain  the  widespread  incidence  of  various 
forms of  “contentious”  politics  (road blocks, tomas, multiple  forms of 
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street protest, and so on), which may be viewed as partially democratic 
both in intention and even in effect. Those whose theoretical rights are 
not  secure  can argue that  they are  agitating  not  only  for  their  own 
interest, but for a more systematic delivery on these official promises to 
everyone.  But,  in  practice,  the best  organised and most  strategically 
located groups may only succeed in extracting concession from the state 
that serve their  narrow group interest,  while  indirectly  weakening its 
neutrality  and  authority  to  promote  the  rights  of  all,  and  indeed 
diverting its energies from the needs of the marginal and disorganised. 
Within this very broad interpretative framework, it should be possible to 
advance  comparative  research  on  democratic  rights  by  collating  the 
evidence available from a series of distinct sources sectors, and policy 
domains.
Rights and Justice Systems
For example, there is an emerging body of comparative work on 
the  observable  performance  of  courts  and  justice  systems,  as  they 
interact with their particular stratum of subjects and citizens in these 
new democracies1. One such study, finds somewhat surprisingly, “that 
social rights have been enforced most readily in new or 
fragile  democracies,  where  the  judicial  branch  has 
typically  not  had  the  time  to  build  the  legitimacy 
required  to  survive  political  conflict,  and  where  the 
resources  needed  to  implement  social  rights  are 
typically  fewer  than  elsewhere”  (GARGARELLA, 
DOMINGO and ROUX, 2006, p. 256).
It turns out that where the resources for social protection are the 
most  inadequate,  and  where  the  authority  of  the  courts  is  most 
precarious, these may be the most favourable conditions for using the 
judiciary  to  keep  alive  the  hope  that  eventually  minimum  social 
entitlements may prove generalisable; and that legal entrepreneurs may 
mobilise  this  potential  as  a  means  to  strengthen  their  otherwise 
precarious  institutional  base.  These  case  studies  point  to  “the 
emancipatory potential of the law and the appropriation of language of 
1 One up-to-date  survey  and  evaluation  of  the  rise  of  justiciable  social  rights  in  new 
democracies since the end of the Cold War is by Gargarella, Domingo and Roux (2006).
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rights [when] courtrooms become an arena for political battles framed in 
the language of rights and constitutional entitlements” (GARGARELLA, 
DOMINGO and ROUX, 2006, p. 269). They suggest “a sort of ‘discovery’ 
of  the  law and legal  channels  from below by citizens  that  are  more 
aware and demanding of their rights, and with changing expectations of 
what  can  be  achieved  through  strategies  of  legal  mobilization” 
(GARGARELLA, DOMINGO and ROUX, 2006, p. 269)2. At the same time, 
they acknowledge at least two crucial limitations to relying on justiciable 
social rights as a means to strengthen the social foundations of fragile 
new democratic regimes. They acknowledge the “selection bias” in their 
choice  of  case  studies  (Brazil,  Hungary,  and  India,  many  be 
unrepresentatively  favourable  examples,  although Angola,  Bolivia  and 
Colombia are also included, and exemplify various types of limitation). 
More critically, they stress that courts alone are unlikely to produce a 
great deal of social change – only if their effects are reinforced by other 
institutions, such as the executive, the legislative, the political parties, 
and  local  administrations  are  these  aspirational  shifts  likely  to  be 
transformed into reliable expectations I  would add the further caveat 
that  the  successful  judicialization  of  social  rights  could  normally  be 
expected to induce its own antidote. Over time, if the courts prove more 
authoritative  than  expected  and  more  capable  of  allocating  scares 
resources,  it  would  be  reasonable  to  anticipate  that  more  privileged 
sectors  of  society would begin to pursue their  own interests through 
legal  channels,  in competition with the poor.  In general,  it  would be 
prudent to expect that the better off will normally be best placed to turn 
such machinery to their advantage, and that legal entrepreneurs have 
more  to  gain  from  servicing  the  elites  than  from  catering  to  the 
dispossessed. At a minimum one might foresee contentious politics and 
instability of rights as a medium term outcome of the judicialization of 
social  entitlements,  particularly  where  the  poor  can  be  divided  by 
language, religion, caste, region, and so on. However that may be, we 
have  here  a  highly  researchable  topic  for  comparative  investigation 
2 The  authors  credit  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)  Human 
Development Reports with a role in sensitizing actors to this potential.
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within the broader field of “democratic citizenship” studies.
Rights and Citizen Security
Citizen security  provides another  quite  specific  and empirically 
researchable area of comparative study within this overall context. It is, 
in  principle,  a  fundamental  responsibility  of  any  democratic  state  to 
provide at least a minimum level of personal and collective security to 
the whole of its citizenry. Many would argue that the state itself rests on 
an underlying social compact, whereby subjects relinquish some of their 
freedom of action (accept the responsibilities of citizenship) in exchange 
for  credible  assurances  of  state  protection.  Should  the  state  fail  (or 
abdicate from) its role as provider of security then its subjects, following 
the inescapable logic of self-preservation would be released from these 
restraints and entitled to save themselves by other means. According to 
this reasoning the democratic state extends additional guarantees to its 
subjects (they become citizens, with civil and political rights as well as 
an  entitlement  to  state  protection)  and  secures  additional  levels  of 
cooperation  in  return.  Citizens  owe  cooperation  rather  than  just 
acquiescence; they gain protection from abusive treatment (dignity) as 
well as the right to survival. Foucault presents this as an internalization 
of restrains that were hitherto outwardly imposed, so that the art  of 
government  becomes  that  of  both  guaranteeing  the  liberty  of  the 
citizenry and also of manufacturing it at each moment. So for him the 
democratic authorities must continually produce, maintain, and also limit 
the freedoms exercised by their citizens, and must allocate the costs 
arising from this public activity3. On this view, the production of liberty 
is  indissolubly  linked to  the manufacture  of  danger.  This  perspective 
may  help  us  understand  the  current  apparent  paradox  of  western 
democracies rushing to establish heightened surveillance and curbs on 
traditional freedoms, in order to counter what is described as existential 
threat  to  democracy  arising  from  “terrorism.”  The  democratization 
3 For a fuller discussion see Whitehead (2002, p. 167).
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literature  has  coined  a  term  for  this  kind  of  highly  constrained 
democracy: democradura4.
But  at  least  in  many  recent  and  fragile  democracies  –  and 
notably in Latin America and the Caribbean – the starting point for this 
type of analysis is open to question. Does the Colombian or Salvadoran 
state  currently  provide  a  minimum  level  of  personal  and  collective 
security  to  the  whole  of  its  citizens?  Although  these  may  both  be 
qualified as broadly “democratic” states, plenty of ethnographic evidence 
exist to indicate that a large section of their electorates have to turn 
elsewhere for their self-preservation (to the cruel protections provided 
by  local  paramilitary  forces,  or  guerrilla  movements,  or  mara  youth 
gangs). Even the official agents of the state – the police, the military, 
the courts – may be far more effective in manufacturing danger for the 
citizenry than in upholding any kind of public freedoms. The evidence on 
this  is  increasingly  standardised  and  available  in  comparative  format 
(homicide rates, proportions of internally displaced persons, kidnapping 
figures, rates of impunity for crimes denounced to the authorities, and 
so on). The evidence suggests large variations between countries, within 
different parts of the same country, and over time. More fine-grained 
comparison often indicates high levels of complexity and ambiguity.
In many new democracies there are highly differentiated systems 
of collective security, they are unstable, and they overlap. Thus, from a 
“bottom up” perspective to judge what guarantees one can rely upon 
requires much finer discriminations than simply “the state” versus “the 
mafia”. The precise location, the time of day, the informal conventions 
of  the locality, may be far more critical  then any abstract  system of 
reassurance or guarantees, either from state agencies or from poderes 
fácticos.  Some  elite  sectors  of  the  population  may  live  in  gated 
communities, protected by private security forces, and mostly sheltered 
from the uncertainties affecting the citizenry in general. At the other end 
of  the  scale,  the  most  vulnerable  may  have  no  realistic  prospect  of 
4 The Primo de Rivera dictatorship  in Spain became known as a “dictablanda.”  In the 
1970s the Uruguayan superficially democratic government of J.M. Bordarberry earned the 
reverse sobriquet “democradura” and both concepts were then generalised.
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obtaining any kind of public protection under any circumstances.  But 
most – unusually a large majority of the democratic electorate – are 
likely to be strung out between these two extremes. They can neither 
rely upon their social compact with the democratic state, nor disregard 
it.  It  has  to  be  factored  in  as  an  aspirational  claim,  a  potential 
entitlement,  and  an  occasional  resource.  But  it  cannot  command 
exclusive  allegiance  from most  citizens,  because  it  does  not  reliably 
protect  them  from  most  threats  to  their  physical  security.  More 
precisely, many citizens in these new democracies do not perceive the 
official security and justice systems as trustworthy first lines of defence 
against basic insecurities.
There are various – perhaps cross-cutting – responses possible 
here,  including  demanding  police  reform  or  mano  dura,  protesting 
against  state  failure  in  this  area,  turning  to  alternative  sources  of 
protection, or (quite commonly) relying on personal survival strategies 
that  weaken  collective  solidarity.  For  their  part,  the  democratic 
authorities have to cope with this public distrust and these legacies of 
state  failure.  They  may  sometimes  devise  incremental  strategies  for 
regaining lost  ground and building conventional  democratic  authority. 
But they may also fall back on short-term expedients that only reinforce 
long-term perceptions of their unreliability. Or they may practice large 
scale denial – deploying an official discourse that pretends they are fully 
in control, while only in practice acting to protect their most limited core 
institutions and constituencies. Just as the most typical response of the 
median  citizen  may  be  salvese  quien  pueda  survival  strategies  that 
weaken  collective  solidarity,  so  at  the  state  level  the  line  of  least 
resistance may well be to remain reactive and thus allow the prevalent 
insecurity to persist. The result is likely to be an unstable equilibrium, or 
as O’Donnell (1993) has written elsewhere, “a low intensity” citizenship.
Comparative research on citizen insecurity in new democracies is 
now underway. It tends to disaggregate this overall picture into a series 
of  more  discrete  and  manageable  sub-themes  –  victimization  rates; 
economic losses attributable to insecurity; access to illegal firearms; and 
so  forth.  This  empirical  mapping  is  indispensable,  but  the  various 
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components  of  the  analysis  must  then  be  reconstituted  into  an 
integrated  account  if  we  are  to  understand  their  implications  for 
citizenship rights and the prospects for democratization. A historically 
based and interpretive synthesis is required for each society in order to 
assess the realistic possibilities for reform. Existing academic studies of 
police and justice system reform tend to produce accounts that “over 
determine” the likelihood of failure. By contrast consultancy and policy 
studies tend to build in “can do” assumptions into their analysis. The 
comparative record casts doubt on both these perspectives.
Careful  comparative  work  on  the  reform and reinforcement  of 
police and penal systems in new democracies should caution us against 
categorical  judgements.  There  certainly  is  a  great  deal  of  underlying 
inertia. Policing is mostly carried out by small groups of officers subject 
to  strong peer  group pressures  and resistant  to  anything more  than 
incremental changes in their informal assessments of the very localised 
conditions they have to deal with on an intimate and daily basis. Similar 
considerations restrict the scope for rapid change in the behaviour of 
prison  officers.  Where  police  and  prison  officials  have  become 
accustomed to operating under authoritarian leadership, the installation 
of a new democracy with a bill or rights and a human rights commission 
can not be expected to feed through automatically to changed official 
treatment  of  suspects  and  detainees.  These  aspects  of  the  pre-
democratic state structure are often among the last to be modified in 
the case of democratization. It is not unusual for traditional methods of 
policing  to  persist  in  general  (although  middle  class  and  educated 
dissidents may no longer be mistreated so badly as common criminals), 
and  for  many  in  the  security  forces  to  view  the  new human  rights 
activist community as their enemies. Despite this general resistance and 
inertia however, other patterns of response can also be noted. In some 
instances the newly created civil rights monitoring agencies have won 
co-operation from the security forces for example by emphasising the 
point  that police and military  personnel  also have human rights  that 
need to be protected.  One striking positive example was the – fairly 
rapid and successful – transformation of the East German Stazi into a 
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fairly  normal  West  German type of  police  force.  Less  extreme cases 
include  the  professionalization  and  rejuvenation  of  personnel  in  the 
Chilean justice  system after  1989; some examples of  provincial-level 
progress even within systems that remain unimproved at the national 
level;  and  intermittent  instances  of  effective  foreign  assistance  to 
promote more democratic policing. The record is very patchy and for 
each example of improvement it is also possible to identify a counter-
example  of  failed  reform  or  even  regression.  Nevertheless,  it 
demonstrates  that  under  certain  circumstances  new democracies  can 
upgrade their justice systems.
Building  democratic  security  and  citizen  confidence  in  public 
authority  is  certainly  difficult,  and  may  be  brought  about  more  by 
indirect  means  than  by  conscious  social  engineering.  But  there  are 
important  examples of  cumulative improvement,  as well  as of  failure 
and indeed degeneration. With longer time frames and better evidence 
comparative  research  may  in  due  course  generate  more  reliable 
knowledge.
Gender and Rights
A well-developed feminist critique of the conventional discourse 
of rights points out the contrast between the (usually male dominated) 
public sphere in which such entitlements can more easily be claimed and 
defended and the (often gender-biased) private sphere in which conflicts 
of  interest  are  regulated  by  informal  mechanisms  that  may  well  be 
governed  by  personalised  reciprocity  and  indeed  structured  by 
patriarchy. Without entering into the details of this critique, or exploring 
the several conclusions it could generate concerning how to define and 
promote women’s rights, the point to note here is that even in the most 
secure  and  well-established  democracies  there  is  an  ongoing  gender 
imbalance that qualifies the abstractions of liberal rights discourse. In 
new  democracies,  with  saturated  labour  markets  and 
socially/geographically  uneven  levels  of  development  such  gender 
imbalances may well be far more extreme and may pose a more frontal 
challenge to assumptions about the universality of individual rights. The 
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religious and cultural dimensions of these imbalances are currently at 
the forefront of public debate in many democracies but the challenge is 
not merely about such issues. Huge inequality can often be observed 
between highly educated women (with the full panoply of rights at their 
disposal) and their live-in maids, informal street vendors and the rest. 
Yet  rich  or  poor,  rights  bearing  or  subordinated  all  women  perform 
essential  tasks  of  child-rearing,  household-sustaining,  and  value-
promoting  that  are  core  activities  for  the  formation  of  a  rights 
consciousness in any democratic  society. It is in principle possible to 
establish  universalistic  public  policies  that  address  this  issue  (e.g. 
Brazil’s  Bolsa Familia) but in this area much remains to be done. This 
brings us to the topic of rights and young people.
The Rights of Young People
In conventional liberal theory young people have “guardians” who 
encourage their self-expression of development, but who also exercise 
rights on their behalf. Thus the vote may be limited to those aged 18 
and above, as may the owing of property, the opening of bank accounts, 
perhaps  the  decisions  to  marry,  and  maybe  (theoretically)  even  the 
decision to commence sexual relations. Yet in practice (and data can be 
assembled to develop this point) a very large proportion of the world’s 
young  people  are  not  being  schooled  in  their  liberal  rights  and 
obligations  as  suggested  by  this  schema. They  may  have  no  real 
guardians, or the adults with legal responsibility for them may be too 
poor or vulnerable to look after them at all (if they cannot look after 
themselves  they  have  to  press  their  wards  to  take  on  adult 
responsibilities  prematurely). Youths  even  be  exploited  rather  than 
protected by the adults who have nominal responsibility for them. Or 
they may retreat into adolescent gangs that turn their backs on adult 
society, and provide their  own brutal alternatives to the conventional 
sources  of  socialization  (via  schools,  youth  clubs,  churches,  and  so 
on). They may even become child soldiers (mostly male) or be trafficked 
as  property  (especially  if  female). Certainly,  by  comparison  with  the 
seven basic rights of the children that United Nations Children's Fund 
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(UNICEF) would like to see universally respected, many of the world’s 
young  people  are  experiencing  neglect,  abuse,  defencelessness,  and 
perverse indoctrination. This is partly just an expression of poverty, but 
it is not that simple. Some poor traditional communities are adequately 
socialising  and  even  protecting  their  young. Many  more  economically 
dynamic and “successful” societies are building their prosperity on the 
unsound  foundations  of  family  disintegration,  school  failure, 
international undocumented migration, and “savage” market relations. 
Our understanding of the social  correlates of alternative development 
paths  requires  careful  tracking  and  mapping  of  this  complex  and 
unstable panorama.
But even if  the young are trained through family,  school,  and 
church or sports club to internalize all  these postulated adult  values, 
they still  have to undergo a long, tortuous,  and somewhat  uncertain 
process of learning and adjusting to conform to their minimum grown up 
obligations. They have to find jobs, form stable relationships, manage 
their own resources, secure respect within their peer groups, and fend 
off  all  kinds of  temptations  and dangers. Still,  according  to  standard 
liberal theory most of them can be expected to manage this adequately 
in due course, and all kinds of provisions are in place to discipline or re-
educate the backsliders (bankruptcy laws,  social  workers,  police,  and 
prisons).  Contrast  this  idealised  picture  with  the  models  of  adult 
behaviour  available  to  so  many  (perhaps  a  majority)  of  the  world’s 
young people, especially in big cities, in recently democratised polities 
and marketised economies, and in the many crisis-torn or even “failed” 
states of  the so-called developing world. Not  only are the supportive 
structures of adult liberal society often lacking, but unprotected youth 
accurately perceives that what awaits them on adulthood is a system of 
incentives and constraints that contradict the rhetoric of universal rights 
and good governance. Only the innocent or the protected offspring of 
the privileged classes can be expect to take that discourse at face value. 
For many (perhaps most), young adults entering the legal status of full 
individual  autonomy,  the  negative  lessons  of  adolescence  are  all  too 
likely  to  be  reinforced  by  their  lived  experiences  of  insecure 
REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 2, n.1, p. 33-50, jan.-jun.2008.
45
DOSSIÊ CONSENSO DE WASHINGTON
employment, unstable household formation, and (non) participation in 
the public sphere.
If  the  under  18s  do  not  vote  then  democratic  politicians  will 
relate to them in a different manner from adults who do. Public policies 
directed  at  the  young  may tend  to  view them more  as  “objects”  of 
administration (numbers to be fed, bussed, or schooled) rather than as 
rights-bearing citizens. In addition state administrators (democratic or 
not) may typically try to reach them through intermediaries (parents, 
teachers,  police officers)  rather than directly.  And in many societies, 
young  people  will  find  they  have  been  stratified  for  administrative 
purposes,  (by  race,  gender,  class,  regional  origin,  among  other 
categories) long before they have been given any opportunity to express 
themselves,  or  even  to  develop  a  sense  of  their  own  identities  and 
aspirations. All this poses a serious challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy 
about what they are entitled to expect from the state, and what the 
state can expect from them.
According to the idealised liberal theory that underpins standard 
exhortations to ensure “transparency,” “accountability,” and “respect for 
the rights of others,” the adult world either is, or ought to be, populated 
by responsible and civically aware citizens. But where do these essential 
actors in any liberal society come from? They are constantly recruited 
and  replenished  from  the  ranks  of  this  youth  population,  whose 
socialization experience is all too often at variance with these principles 
of adult responsibility and civility. Consequently failures of socialization 
at  the  pre-adult  level  readily  feed  through  into  instabilities  and 
incapacities to stabilise the rights theoretically assigned to all adults in a 
liberal democracy. Weakened family structures and ineffective schooling 
thus reproduce rights volatility and variability across the generations.
Rights and Access to Information
Another fundamental attribute of democratic citizenship concerns 
the so called “right to information.” In practice, of course, even in the 
most secure and liberal of the old democracies, this so called “right” is 
hedged  around  with  limitations  and  qualifications.  There  is  the 
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information required to conduct dialogue and deliberation in the public 
sphere. But there is always a large area of “insider” knowledge – official 
records that are classified as secret; unofficial background information 
that puts the official record into the perspective required to decipher its 
true  significance;  hidden  interpersonal  and  financial  data  that  could 
reveal the base motives that sometimes drive decisions ostensibly taken 
in the public interest; and there is always also a second large area of 
private, personal information that can be deemed irrelevant to the public 
sphere. How these boundaries are drawn (and periodically redefined) is 
a  recurrent  theme  in  democratic  politics.  Given  the  “grey  areas” 
involved, and the shifting dynamics of public confidence in all large scale 
political systems it is not surprising that the limits to public information 
are  typically  contested  and subject  to  variation,  both over  time and 
between democracies. Nevertheless the twin concepts of citizenship and 
the democratic state rest on the assumed existence of a relatively large 
and  secure  public  sphere,  within  which  different  conceptions  of  the 
collective interest can be debated and chosen between on the basis of a 
shared repertoire of public knowledge.
However,  in many new democracies the stability and scope of 
this public sphere is far from being a given. The dominant news media 
may well have a long track record as defenders of the pre-democratic 
order (such as El Mercurio in Chile, or Televisa in Mexico). Journalists 
and newscasters may have been trained and promoted on the strength 
of their ability to promote official discourse, rather than because of their 
critical or investigative skills. State controlled media may continue these 
bad old  practices;  private  and privatized news media may serve the 
interests  of  their  owners  and  advertisers  rather  than  of  the  new 
democratic  system.  Voters  and  citizens  may  find  it  difficult  to 
discriminate  between  genuine  public  information,  disinformation,  and 
comforting  propaganda.  The  Habermasian  ideal  of  unfettered 
communicative  interaction  (HABERMAS,  1987)  is  probably  too 
intellectualised,  and  too  demanding  of  the  attentions  of  the  median 
voter,  even  in  the  most  highly  educated  and  politicised  of  “really 
existing” democracies. In fragile new democracies this public sphere is 
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likely  to  expand  and  contract  quite  unpredictably  and  generally  to 
operate at an uneven and inadequate level of reliability. This will reflect 
the  inherited legacies  of  the pre-democratic  era,  the incomplete  and 
unequal qualities of citizenship established, and the problems of state 
authority and public policy formation outlined elsewhere in this article. 
Of  course,  not  all  new  democracies  are  equally  afflicted,  and  it  is 
certainly  possible  to  trace  some  heartening  experiences  of  rapid 
progress  in  building  a  culture  of  pluralist  public  deliberation  where 
censorship and orthodoxy previously prevailed (the Portuguese weekly 
Expresso,  for  instance,  played  a  remarkably  constructive  role  in  this 
sense in the 1970s; and a comparative analysis could map and trace an 
impressive range of analogous experiences elsewhere – although they 
might often prove time limited and restricted to a small segment of the 
total electorate).
In general, however, the citizenry of most new democracies has 
to make its leadership and policy choices, and to interpret its ongoing 
political realities, on the basis of public information that falls drastically 
short of what would be required by most theories of transparency and 
accountability. The “right to information” enjoyed by most voters in new 
democracies is even more constrained, distorted, and subject to reversal 
than is  the case in long-established democratic  regimes.  Here too,  a 
“quality of democracy” analysis that seriously ranks and compares the 
communications performance of governments, media, think tanks, and 
the like in different new democracies would be likely to uncover large 
inter-country  and  inter-temporal  variations,  together  with  great 
differences between regions and social strata. As with the other spheres 
of citizenship reviewed in this brief article, instability and unreliability 
are often key watchwords. Where this becomes apparent, it may sow 
popular distrust and citizen disillusion, although it can also serve as a 
spur to corrective reforms
Conclusions
In the space available it has only been possible to comment on a 
partial selection of the many rights claimed by citizens in contemporary 
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democracies. The complete ensemble would also need to include more 
social rights; environmental protections (including the rights and duties 
associated with inter-generational transfers); the rights of refugees and 
internally displaced persons; the rights of the aged; and perhaps some 
collective  rights  claimed by ethnic  and religious  minorities  and other 
discriminated-against groups. The language of rights can be applied in 
all  these  areas  and  wherever  it  is  adopted  the  implication  of  this 
discourse will  be that such rights need to be universally applied and 
need to be given precedence over more partial and self-serving claims. 
This paper is not an attack on the moral or philosophical basis of such 
claims nor is it intended to belittle the beneficial consequences that can 
follow from their adoption. It is, however, a reminder of the sociological 
reality that in highly fragmented and unequal societies the rhetoric of 
universality  is  unlikely  to  translate  easily  into  genuine  evenness  of 
application.  Also,  in  new  democracies  emerging  from  authoritarian 
regimes, the sudden emerging explosion of rights claims and the abrupt 
multiplication of rights claimants can easily generate an atmosphere of 
rights inflation that may stimulate activism and social anxiety, and this 
is liable to raise expectations well beyond what is reliably deliverable. 
For all these reasons, social mapping of the range and distribution of 
bankable rights is likely to uncover a reality that falls well short of the 
rhetoric  of  universalism.  Especially  in  new democracies this  empirical 
variability  may be accompanied (for  most  citizens) by a considerable 
degree  of  instability  over  time  (“volatility”).  The  combination  of 
variability and volatility in societies where the “duties” corresponding to 
rights  are  not  securely  internalised,  is  liable  to  produce  patterns  of 
political  behaviour  that  deviate  substantially  from  the  interlocking 
mutuality  of  interest  postulated  by  classical  liberalism.  “Contentious” 
political cycles of resistance and exclusion, and struggles to reshape the 
rules of the game (rather than merely to live within them) seem to be 
natural  correlates of this climate of  uncertainty. All  this may well  be 
reinforced  by  the  growing  impact  of  “globalization,”  which  generates 
diasporas  and  transnational  communities  that  further  challenge 
universalism and established rights.
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